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1. Introduction
In this paper we argue that German industrial relations 
are undergoing a process of fundamental liberalization, albeit 
incremental and protracted over time, which in turn is hav-
ing a transformative impact on the German political economy, 
contributing to transforming it from wage-led to profit-led, 
and specifically to a particular type of profit-led: export-led.
Given the country’s recent economic success through the 
crisis, the German model has been hailed by some academics 
as a blueprint for reform by other EU countries (Anderton et 
al. 2012; Dustmann, Fitzenberger et al. 2014). Politicians in 
crisis-ridden countries have echoed these views. For example, 
former Italy’s Prime Minister Mario Monti declared proudly 
that his goal was «to make Italy as similar to Germany 
as possible»1. In contrast, we argue here that the German 
export-led model does not represent a sustainable long-term 
equilibrium, let alone an example for other countries, because 
its success is contingent on it remaining an exception. Further-
more, the social desirability of the model is questionable as 
indicated by the deterioration of various distributive indicators 
of social welfare.
The paper is composed of a quantitative and a qualitative, 
historical part. The quantitative part argues through simple sta-
tistics that the German economic growth model is turning into 
a profit-led one, and consequently that policies which directly 
1 Warum Italien mehr wie Deutschland sein sollte, in Die Welt, Jan. 11, 2012.
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and indirectly boost the profit share of GDP (or, conversely, 
reduce the wage share), such as labor market liberalization, 
have in the case of Germany positive trickle-down effects on 
the rest of the economy. As an economy that has come to 
depend predominantly on exports, Germany is different from 
other large Eurozone countries, such as France or Italy, which 
are instead still predominantly wage-led.
The focus of the historical part is on industrial relations 
institutions, and specifically on the organizational crisis of trade 
unions, the weakening of sectoral bargaining through opening 
clauses, and the various reforms of labor market institutions 
and employment contracts2. There is coevolution between in-
dustrial relations shifts and the emergence and consolidation 
of the export-led model. The industrial relations changes have 
contributed to the shift in growth model by weakening the 
institutional channels through which productivity increases feed 
into domestic consumption and by facilitating wage repression. 
In turn the shift in macroeconomic regime contributes to the 
deterioration of industrial relations institutions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in 
section 2 we develop the argument about the shift in the 
German growth model; in section 3 we provide an historical 
account of the liberalization process from the golden age of 
the German model to the new export model; and in section 
4 we conclude by discussing theoretical implications for the 
study of contemporary capitalism.
2. a shifting growth model?
This section draws on the attempt by various heterodox 
macroeconomists (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990; Stockhammer 
et al. 2011; Hein and Mundt 2012, Lavoie and Stockhammer 
2012; Onaran and Galanis 2012; Storm and Naastepad 2012; 
2 Although there is evidence that the German financial system is also undergo-
ing liberalization (Höpner 2001; Streeck 2009; Culpepper 2010), the econometric 
evidence does not suggest that German investments are significantly more sensitive 
to profitability than in other countries, or that they have become more sensitive 
over time (Stockhammer et al. 2011; Onaran and Galanis 2012). Partly for these 
reasons, and also to keep the paper within reasonable limits, we do not deal with 
financial institutions and corporate governance here, even though a fuller treatment 
should incorporate them. 
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Storm and Naastepad 2012) to develop an alternative to the 
standard NAIRU-based macroeconomic framework which has 
inspired labor market policy in the past 30 years (OECD 
1994; e.g. Layard et al. 2005; Blanchard 2006; Carlin and 
Soskice 2006).
NAIRU-based macroeconomics is based on the idea that 
there is a non-inflation-accelerating rate of unemployment 
(NAIRU), i.e. a rate of unemployment at which prices grow at 
a stable rate. Attempts to reduce such «natural» rate through 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies are doomed to failure 
and would only generate an inflationary spiral, which would 
then have to be quashed through restrictive economic policies 
in classic «stop-and-go» mode. The NAIRU is determined not 
by aggregate demand, as in Keynesian macroeconomics, but by 
supply-side conditions such as the strength of organized labor 
and the extent of labor market rigidities boosting labor power.
Although the NAIRU framework does not rely on the as-
sumption of perfect markets  –  on the contrary it assumes 
oligopolistic markets, mark-up pricing, and wage determination 
through collective bargaining  –  its policy implications are vir-
tually indistinguishable from those of a neoclassical economic 
framework in which the labor market clears and voluntary 
unemployment does not exist. In NAIRU-based macroeconom-
ics all institutional rigidities cause the NARU to rise, with one 
exception: coordinated wage bargaining. This institutional ar-
rangement is considered beneficial because it is associated with 
wage moderation: in centralized bargaining large, encompassing 
wage setters internalize the systemic repercussions of excessive 
wage demands (Tarantelli 1986; Calmfors and Driffill 1988). 
This makes price stability compatible with a lower level of 
unemployment (Layard et al. 2005). The logical implication of 
the theory is that lowering the NAIRU implies targeting the 
institutional rigidities that prop it up (Blanchard and Wolfers 
2000; Nickell et al. 2005).
In contrast with the NAIRU framework, the heterodox 
approach goes back to one of Keynes’ foundational ideas: 
unemployment is first and foremost determined by aggregate 
demand and not by supply-side conditions. Another source 
of inspiration is Kalecki’s emphasis on the importance of 
the functional income distribution between wages and profits 
(Stockhammer and Stehrer 2009). The propensity to consume 
is generally higher for wage income than for profit income. 
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Therefore, a distributional shift favoring profits over wages 
may depress aggregate demand and have a negative impact 
on employment, unless it is compensated by growth in other 
components, such as investments, government expenditures, 
or net exports (exports minus imports).
To the extent that investments depend on profitability, real 
wage growth (when it is not compensated by productivity 
increases and leads to a reduction of unitary profits) may 
have a negative impact on investments. Net exports, too, may 
be negatively affected by wage growth since they tend to be 
negatively affected by increases in domestic prices relative to 
international competitors (if uncompensated by exchange rate 
devaluations). In brief, real wage growth is not an uncondi-
tional boon for an economy and may in some circumstances 
reduce GDP growth through its negative impact on invest-
ments and net exports.
Figuring out empirically a demand regime implies estimat-
ing which of these causal paths prevails. If the sum total of 
the various effects associated with a marginal decline in the 
wage share (equivalently, an increase in the profit share) is a 
decline in GDP, then the economy in question is wage-led. If 
vice versa, the marginal effect is positive, for example because 
the decline in consumption is more than counterbalanced by 
the increase in investments and net exports, then the economy 
is profit-led. Recent econometric analyses suggest that most 
advanced economies are wage-led (Onaran and Galanis 2012; 
Storm and Naastepaad 2012a), but as we will see later in the 
section Germany may be an exception.
By incorporating the role of aggregate demand and redistri-
bution in the analysis of political economic developments, this 
framework promises to shed light on certain dimensions that are 
generally underplayed by other comparative political economy 
perspectives, such as the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) one 
(Hall and Soskice 2001). The intellectual foundations of VoC 
were elaborated in the 1980s when Keynesian demand manage-
ment was discredited and supply-side economics was rising to 
prominence. The key theoretical concepts of the VoC approach 
(«production regime», «coordination», «skill-specificity», etc.) 
all capture particular features of the supply-side of a national 
political economy. Just as in the case of NAIRU-based mac-
roeconomics, the demand side and the functional distribution 
of income play little or even no role at all in VoC analyses 
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(exceptions are Carlin and Soskice 2009; Iversen and Soskice 
2012). Furthermore, while the crucial distinction between co-
ordinated and liberal market economies tends to be static in 
VoC since it is rooted in long-standing features of European 
societies, the distinction between wage-led and profit-led out-
lined above is more dynamic. Wage-led economies may turn 
into profit-led ones if domestic consumption is repressed long 
enough, if investments become more sensitive to profitability 
as a result of international shifts such as capital openness, and 
if exports become a large component of aggregate demand. 
In turn, a country’s growth model exerts a decisive influence 
on domestic political economic developments, as illustrated by 
Bhaduri and Marglin’s (1990, p. 388) illuminating analysis of 
how globalization tends to move countries away from wage-
led growth and how this shift alters the economic policies of 
even left-of-center governments:
A dominant trade effect tends to make the stagnationist [i.e. wage-led] 
logic increasingly irrelevant in a world characterized by high trade interde-
pendence. The left social-democratic emphasis on wage-led expansion de-
rived from the stagnationist logic may be given up in the pursuit of export 
surplus by following restrictive macroeconomic policies to keep down real 
wages (and inflation) for greater international price competitiveness. Further, 
so long as successful export performance maintains a high enough level of 
employment to overcompensate a relatively low real wage rate, cooperation 
between labor and capital may continue to be feasible ... The only problem 
with this strategy is that it is impossible for all countries to achieve a trade 
surplus simultaneously. And yet, the lure of this impossibility has contributed 
substantially to the disintegration of the traditional social democratic ideology 
without any coherent alternative taking its place. (emphasis ours)
In profit-led economies, the primacy of profits in spur-
ring growth is determined by essentially two conditions: high 
sensitivity of investments to (current and future) profitability 
and high sensitivity of exports to changes in relative unit la-
bor costs. Relative unit labor cost increases (unless corrected 
by exchange rate devaluation, which is difficult with fixed 
exchange rates and impossible in a common currency regime) 
tend to decrease the competitiveness of domestic manufactures 
and of internationally traded services and to increase the price 
competitiveness of imports. Both the impact of investments and 
exports is contingent on their becoming a sizeable portion of 
aggregate demand.
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Figure 1 and 2 begin to illustrate how these ideas con-
tribute to explain the trajectory of the German economy 
in the last 30 years. Figure 1 plots the evolution of private 
consumption as a percentage of GDP in Germany. The graph 
shows a rising trend until 1990, a step increase correspond-
ing to the unification shock around 1990, and then a steadily 
declining trend from 1990 on3. Figure 2 shows the trend of 
exports as a percentage of GDP. These have been growing 
steadily between 1960 and 2010. However, the growing trend 
is markedly steeper from 1990 on. Germany has become a 
much more export-dependent economy in the 20 years after 
unification and exports as percentage of GDP have increased 
from 20% to more than 50%  –  a percentage generally seen 
in small open economies. Imports have followed suit, but to 
a lesser extent. Imports are somewhat endogenously linked 
to exports because exports also include imported intermedi-
ate goods that are offshored to foreign countries and then 
3 The slack in private consumption was not picked up by investments. In fact, 
investments declined until the late 1980s, then improved until the late 1990s (cor-
responding to the unification period), and then went through a new decline in the 
2000s. The least that can be said about German investments is that they are not 
the driving force of German growth.
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Fig. 1. Trajectory of private consumption as a percentage of GDP.
Source: AMECO Database.
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incorporated into the final phases of production. According 
to data reported in Stockhammer (2011, p. 14), the import 
content of German exports in 2000 was 38% and had grown 
for 40 years. Figure 3 shows that the wage share of GDP has 
declined continuously for 30 years until 2008. The response to 
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Fig. 3. Trajectory of the wage share. 
Source: AMECO Database.
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the financial crisis of 2008 (labor hoarding) led to a modest 
increase in the wage share, but it was largely insufficient to 
make up for lost ground.
Hence, three trends stand out: a decline in the wage share; 
the compression of domestic consumption from 1990 on, and 
the acceleration in exports as a percentage of GDP in the 
same period. 
To understand what these developments may imply for the 
German growth model, we rely on recent estimates of the 
sensitivity of various components of German aggregate demand 
to changes in the wages and profits. These estimates are from 
Onaran and Galanis (2012) and are based on an econometric 
analysis for the period between 1961 and 2007. The time series 
are short, and possibly for this reason no robust evidence of 
a structural break (i.e. a significant change in parameters over 
time) is found, even though Stockhammer et al. (2011) find 
a sizeable increase in the sensitivity of exports to the ratio 
between export prices and import prices after 1987.
The relevant estimates are reported in Table 1. They show 
that German consumption is heavily sensitive to wage move-
ments, and that a decline of 1% in wages reduces consump-
tion by close to 1% (0.71%). The impact on consumption of 
a reduction in profits is unsurprisingly much lower (0.09%) 
since profit income is characterized by a lower marginal pro-
pensity to consume. German investments seem rather sensitive 
to profits: they increase considerably when the profit share is 
higher (0.59%). However, the share of investments in GDP has 
been declining, and therefore the overall impact on the growth 
model has been declining too. Finally, exports are sensitive 
to movements in the wage share: a marginal increase in the 
Tab. 1. Elasticities of various components of aggregate demand (1961-2007)
dC/dW (1) 0.71
dC/dR (2) 0.09
dI/dπ (3) 0.59
dX/dRULC (4) –0.31
dM/dRULC (5) 0.00
Source: Onaran and Galanis (2012).
(1) C = consumption; W = wages
(2) C = consumption; R = profits
(3) I = private investments; π = profit share (long-run coefficient from ECM equation)
(4) X = exports; RULC = real unit labor costs (≈ wage share)
(5) M = imports; RULC = real unit labor costs (≈ wage share)
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wage share (decline in the profit share) reduces exports. Since 
exports have grown dramatically as a share of GDP, and are 
negatively affected by the wage share, it seems that reducing 
the wage share has contributed to stimulating exports, possibly 
through the increase in competitiveness.
In Figure 4 the elasticities reported in Table 1 are transformed 
into marginal effects by multiplying them by the time-varying 
values of consumption, investment, and exports as a share of 
GDP. The resulting graph shows the overall impact of a 1% 
increase in the profit share (1 minus the wage share). For 
comparison purposes, Figures 5 and 6 display the same marginal 
effect for two large Eurozone economies: France and Italy.
In the case of Germany the negative impact on GDP growth 
of a reduction in the wage share has been steadily declining 
from the 1990s on. In other words, Germany has been moving 
steadily away from a wage-led and towards a profit-led model 
from the early 1990s on. At the beginning of the 2010 decade 
the country was almost at a point of indifference between a 
wage-led and profit-led growth4. The trajectory of France and 
4 If the multiplier, i.e. long-term effects, is factored in, Germany is in 2010 exactly 
indifferent between wage-led and profit-led (multiplier calculations and corresponding 
graph not shown here). 
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Fig. 4. Impact on GDP of a 1% increase in the profit share: Germany.
Source: see text.
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Fig. 5. Impact on GDP of a 1% increase in the profit share: France.
Source: see text.
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Fig. 6. Impact on GDP of a 1% increase in the profit share: Italy.
Source: see text.
Italy is instead very different and these two countries remain 
strongly wage-led: a reduction in the wage share depresses 
growth because the decline in domestic consumption prevails 
over the stimulation of investments and exports.
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This analysis suggests that Germany is not quite a profit-led 
economy yet but is clearly moving in that direction. Hence 
policies of wage repression, which bring havoc to other large 
Eurozone countries such as France and Italy, do not have the 
same negative impact in Germany. In addition, Germany is 
becoming a particular type of profit-led model: investments do 
not play a large role any more, and the economy is pulled 
almost exclusively by exports.
None of the effects analyzed above reflect deep underly-
ing economic necessities. The transformation from wage- to 
profit-led is at least partly a matter of distributive conflict 
and associated politics. The softening of industrial relations 
and other labor market institutions has weakened the wage-
led channel, and through the effect on competitiveness, has 
strengthened the export-led one. We examine these develop-
ments in the next section. 
3. The erosion of German industrial relations (1970-2010)
a) The German model as it once was
Traditional accounts of the German model of production 
emphasized the beneficial constraints of vocational training and 
industrial relations institutions (Streeck 1991). Since the end 
of the seventies German companies shifted away from mass 
production to the so called model of «Diversified Quality 
Production» (DQP), characterized by a broad variety of in-
novative and technologically advanced manufacturing products 
(Sorge and Streeck 1987). The strategy of moving upmarket, 
which partly relieved the competitive pressure on labor costs, 
was facilitated by institutional rigidities.
The German vocational training, co-financed by employers 
and the state, provided a large supply of skilled workers who 
could cope with the technologies and the complex work or-
ganization of DQP. Indeed, management and works councils 
collaborated to create a work organization which relied on 
teamwork, task rotation, and mutual trust in order to better 
exploit the high professionalism of the workforce (Kern and 
Schumann 1984; Streeck 1991).
Strong and encompassing industrial relations institutions at 
workplace, sectoral and national level prevented employers from 
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cutting labor costs. Thus employers were «nudged» to invest 
in technology, innovation, and training in order to maintain 
high productivity rates. First, high dismissal protection limited 
employers’ casualization strategies, constituted an incentive to 
long-term staff planning, and was functional to the complex 
work organization of German firms (Streeck 1992, p. 32; 
Iversen and Soskice 2001). Second, sectoral bargaining pre-
vented whipsawing by marginal firms. The high coverage rate 
of sectoral agreements was due both to union strength and, 
especially, to high employers’ cohesion. In 1984 the employers’ 
organizational density covered 74.5% of the employees (Silvia 
1997, p. 193). Metal sectoral agreements covered around 80% 
of the workforce. Third, highly unionized works councils with 
codetermination rights at company level implemented sectoral 
agreements and bargained over additional issues such as non-
wage benefits, bonuses and working time (Jürgens 1984).
Furthermore, the system of pattern bargaining ensured that 
the benefits of high productivity in manufacturing spread 
across sectors: IG Metall acted as pace-setter in the collective 
bargaining system and oriented its bargaining goals towards 
the productivity rates of the economy as a whole instead of 
the sectoral rates, setting a floor for the negotiations of other 
sectoral unions (Schulten 2001, p. 5). As a result, at the be-
ginning of the nineties Germany had one of the lowest rates 
of intersectoral wage dispersion among OECD countries after 
Belgium and the Scandinavian countries (Hassel and Schulten 
1998, p. 487). The pattern bargaining system contributed to 
the success and the stability of the traditional German model 
of production because it allowed for coordination between 
the negotiations of the social partners and the directives of 
the independent Federal Bank for an anti-inflationary wage 
growth (Hall 1994).
Even though the classic literature on the German model 
mainly focused on the supply-side of the DQP model (e.g. high 
skills, rigid institutions), industrial relations played an important 
role also on the demand-side of the economy, ensuring that 
mass DQP matched mass consumption. Thanks to encompass-
ing bargaining institutions, productivity increases fed into wage 
increases and the purchasing power of different segments of 
the labor force remained approximately constant (Schulten 
2004, p. 5). These institutions reveal interconnections also in 
their redistributive function: thanks to pattern bargaining, the 
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productivity of the core manufacturing sector was redistributed 
to low-value added sectors (e.g. services), while sectoral bargain-
ing redistributed from workers in most productive companies 
to workers in less productive ones. At company-level, works 
councils were constrained by sectoral agreements in their bar-
gaining freedom and made sure that these were applied to all 
workers in the firm along the supply chain.
b) The liberalization process
The current literature acknowledges that the German model 
as laid out in stylized form above no longer exists (e.g. Hassel 
1999; Bispinck et al. 2010). However, there is still disagree-
ment as to the extent to which this process has involved 
the whole German political economy, including the DQP 
sectors, or rather only the service sector. The deterioration 
of wages and working conditions in the service sector has 
been well-documented (Bosch and Weinkopf 2008; Doellgast 
2009; Jaehrling and Méhaut 2012). Among others, Bosch and 
Weinkopf (2008) have illustrated the expansion of low-wage 
work in low-end services such as retail, catering and call centers 
due to eroding bargaining institutions and to the diffusion of 
mini-jobs and other atypical contracts. In contrast, industrial 
relations in core manufacturing sectors have been argued to 
still reflect the characteristics of the traditional German model, 
which are considered key to the export success of Germany, 
while the deregulated service periphery contributes to keep 
labor costs low (Palier and Thelen 2010; Hassel 2014). As 
the core manufacturing sectors are critical for assessing the 
extent of the process of liberalization, they are the focus of 
the remainder of this section.
We identify the start of the liberalization process with the 
unions’ battle to reduce working time in 1983, which set in 
motion a decentralizing trend in collective bargaining. In a 
context of slow growth rates and high unemployment, unions 
shifted the bargaining focus from wages to qualitative issues 
such as work-life balance and work organization arrangements. 
This increased the relevance of company-level bargaining be-
cause work organization and flexible work arrangements are 
better regulated between works councils and management. In 
line with the new qualitative orientation, IG Metall demanded 
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a working time reduction to 35 hours a week in the 1983 
bargaining round. This bargaining strategy was also meant 
to tackle high unemployment rates (Artus 2001, pp. 88 ss.). 
Employers’ initial refusal was followed by a seven-week strike, 
until IG Metall and Gesamtmetall agreed on a working time 
reduction in steps, starting with 38.5 hours a week. In ex-
change, unions made the concession for increased bargaining 
room over working time flexibility at workplace through the 
introduction of opening clauses (French 2000, p. 203).
Even though the goal of 35 hours/week was achieved only in 
the Western metal and printing industry, the selective reduction 
of working time in establishments affected by economic downturn 
spread massively during the economic crisis in 1993-94 (Lehndorff 
2001, p. 19). To this trend contributed also the metal collective 
agreement achieved in Eastern Germany in 1996, which gave 
companies in difficult economic conditions the opportunity to 
introduce opening clauses on wages and working time under 
the approval of a commission constituted by representatives of 
IG Metall and Gesamtmetall. This agreement was the outcome 
of the compromise reached by IG Metall and Eastern metal 
employers after Gesamtmetall’s suspension of the staged waged 
agreement of 1991 (Stufenplan), which linked the wage rates in 
the East to Western rates in order to achieve wage parity by 
1994 (French 2000, pp. 206-209). The hardship clauses quickly 
spread across sectors (Bahnmüller et al. 1999, p. 57) and soon 
became a common instrument also in Western Germany.
Indeed, in the nineties Western Germany, too, entered a 
period of economic recession, characterized by high unemploy-
ment rates. In those years the employers’ associations  –  espe-
cially Gesamtmetall  –  gave signs of withdrawing support from 
sectoral bargaining institutions as their members  –  especially 
small and middle-sized companies  –  complained about high 
wage levels and demanded flexible company-level solutions 
(Hassel and Rehder 2001, p. 5). In order to prevent them 
from leaving the employers’ associations altogether, the latter 
introduced the option for membership without applying the 
sectoral agreement (Ohne Tarifbindung (OT)-Mitgliedschaften). 
The metal bargaining round in 1994 was characterized by high 
levels of industrial conflict. It froze wages for one year and 
allowed works councils to bargain short-time work arrange-
ments (up to 30 hours/week) at company level in exchange 
of employment security (Turner 1998, pp. 102-106).
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The increased bargaining room at company-level was nego-
tiated while works councils were already under pressure for 
concessions because of the credible threat of disinvestment and 
of high unemployment rates (Turner 1998, p. 100). Compa-
nies had started restructuring their value chain into modules, 
which could be carried out by suppliers both in Germany and 
abroad. While the value chain of big automotive firms became 
increasingly disintegrated and fragmented (Jürgens 2004, p. 
419; Doellgast and Greer 2007), the new markets in Eastern 
Europe opened up new outsourcing possibilities for compa-
nies to access close and cheap production sites (Jürgens and 
Krzywdzinski 2006, p. 3).
Thus, opening clauses – the so called «Pacts for Employment 
and Competitiveness» (PECs)  –  were often bargained under 
the threat of outsourcing, and the works councils were made 
co-responsible for the competitiveness of the production site 
(Rehder 2003, pp. 113-116). According to a survey conducted 
among works councils in the manufacturing sector between 
2003 and 2005, 44% of big companies with more than 1,000 
employees threatened works councils to outsource some produc-
tion segments abroad, while another 20% actually transferred 
part of their production abroad (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 
2010, p. 211). Differently from company-level pacts in the 
Eighties, PECs could amend and worsen collective agreements 
at sectoral level (Hassel and Rehder 2001). As a result, PECs 
quickly spread across sectors. They mainly included measures 
regarding working time, work re-organization, early retirements, 
and wage cuts or freezes (Seifert and Massa-Wirth 2005).
Parallel to the progressive bargaining decentralization, at the 
national level a tripartite consultation arena called «Alliance for 
Jobs» was launched in 1995 and then in 1998 with the aim of 
keeping unemployment under control through national policy 
interventions. Despite union opposition, the outcomes of both 
the first and second Alliance were the relaxation of employ-
ment protection for small companies, welfare state cuts, and 
wage moderation (Bispinck and Schulten 2000; Hassel 2001).
However, the most far-reaching regulatory changes were in-
troduced through unilateral national-level policy interventions, 
and particularly through the package of labor market, tax, 
and welfare reforms known as Agenda 2010. Agenda 2010, 
adopted by the Red-Green government in 2003, was mainly 
based on the proposals of the so-called «Hartz Commission», 
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which aimed to halve the unemployment rate over three years 
by reforming the active and passive labor market policies and 
by deregulating the labor market (Menz 2005, p. 204). The 
Hartz reforms came into force between 2003 and 2005.
Hartz I and II deregulated the use of atypical work. Hartz 
I lifted the limitations to the use of agency work, which 
dramatically increased also in the core manufacturing sectors 
(Benassi and Dorigatti 2014). Companies could hire on agency 
contracts without specifying the reason for the fixed-term and 
without offering any guaranty of a permanent job afterwards. 
Dismissal protection was lowered as agencies could employ 
workers on contracts of the same duration as their assign-
ment at the hiring company. The equal pay principle could 
be amended by collective agreement (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 
2011, p. 5). Due to unforeseen competition with the Christian 
unions, the DGB bargaining body could sign a collective 
agreement setting low wage standards (Vitols 2008). Hartz 
II created employment contracts with lower social security 
contributions and tax rates. These so called «mini-jobs» and 
«midi-jobs» can generate respectively an income of maximum 
400€ and 800€ a month. The reform lifted the limitation of 
15 hours/week which used to apply to marginal employment, 
offering employers an exit option from the collective agree-
ments (Weinkopf 2009, p. 13). Hartz IV, which reformed 
the system of social and unemployment benefits, shortened 
the length and the amount of unemployment subsidies and 
tightened the eligibility criteria for unemployment assistance. 
Furthermore, the criteria defining the acceptability of a job 
were changed, pushing workers in low-end labor market seg-
ments to accept any job position (Hassel and Schiller 2010, 
pp. 26-34).
In synthesis, German industrial relations have been un-
dergoing a process of erosion and decentralization since the 
Eighties, which has affected the coordination between sectoral 
and company-level agreements and prevented the redistribu-
tion of productivity gains across companies and sectors. At 
the national level the Alliance for Jobs and the Hartz reforms 
have favored the expansion of flexible low-wage jobs, further 
contributing to the segmentation of the workforce. As a re-
sult, the German model has considerably changed from the 
traditional Modell Deutschland of the Eighties, as the following 
section illustrates.
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c) Industrial relations in the new German export model
The wage trend represented in Figure 7 clearly shows the 
difference between services and manufacturing, but also the 
declining wage trend in core sectors. In low-end services, 
the trend of real wages in regard to productivity is declining 
and is increasingly divergent in respect to the trend in core 
manufacturing sectors. In line with the literature mentioned 
above on the dualization of the German economy (Palier 
and Thelen 2010; Hassel 2014), the figure suggests that the 
system of pattern bargaining has eroded and service unions 
do not manage anymore to follow the pace set by the Ger-
man manufacturing unions. However, the figure also shows 
that real wages in high-end manufacturing have not kept up 
with labor productivity since mid-2000s either (Baccaro and 
Benassi 2014).
The declining trend of real wages in core manufacturing 
sectors is due to different reasons such as the eroding power 
of unions, the decline of bargaining coverage and the diffu-
sion of atypical contracts. Union density has been declining 
since the post-unification membership boom, reaching the 
downward peak of 18.6% in 2010 (ICTWSS 2011). However, 
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Fig. 7.  Trends in real wages (high-end manufacturing and low-end services) and labor 
productivity (total economy) (1991-2007).
Source: Table from Baccaro and Benassi (2014), EU KLEMS database.
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one third of union members are still organized by IG Metall 
(DGB 2013). The overall employers’ density  –  in terms of 
employees’ coverage  –  in 2006 was 63% but it is lower in 
the metal sector (Bispinck et al. 2010, p. 19). In Western 
Germany employers’ density was around 58% in 2004, and in 
Eastern Germany the rate was 40% lower (Silvia and Schroeder 
2007: 1440). Furthermore, Gesamtmetall reports that 2,400 
companies out of the 6,300 Gesamtmetall members have an 
OT-Mitgliedschaft  –  that is, they do not apply any collective 
agreements (Gesamtmetall 2013).
The decline of associational membership is reflected in the 
eroding bargaining coverage. Table 2 reports the bargaining 
and works councils’ coverage rates of establishments in core 
manufacturing sectors5 and in low-end services6 based on the 
establishment panel of the Institute for Employment Research 
(IAB). It shows that the collective bargaining coverage of 
establishments has declined from almost 60% in 1995 to 
26% in 2010 in manufacturing sectors, while in services it 
dropped from 43% to almost 30%. In both industries, the 
coverage rate of company-level agreements decreased until 
1.5% (manufacturing) and almost 2% (services). In addition, 
the establishment coverage of works councils in manufacturing 
has almost halved between 1995 and 2010, dropping from 
15.3% to 8.7%.
5 Automotive, chemical, electrical engineering, machine tool building, metal pro-
cessing, precision mechanics and ship and plane building.
6 Hotel and catering, retail, waste disposal and the category «other services». 
Tab. 2. Bargaining coverage in core manufacturing sectors and low-end service sectors
% plants with works 
councils
% sectoral bargaining 
agreements
% company-level 
agreements
year manufacturing services manufacturing services manufacturing services
1995 15,3a 5,05 59,3 43,4 4,34 7,63
2000 10,7 7,26 47,8 40,5 2,61 2,34
2005 7,74 5,22 36,5 30,7 2,91 2,09
2010 8,74 5,91 26,2 29,4 1,53 1,97
a Refers to 1994.
Source: Table adapted from Baccaro and Benassi (2014), data from the IAB 
establishment panel.
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Furthermore, the already low percentage of establishments 
covered by collective agreements makes extensive use of 
opening clauses, especially in export manufacturing sectors 
which are subject to competition. According data reported in 
Baccaro and Benassi 2014, in the years 2005 and 2007 50% 
of the manufacturing plants covered by collective agreements 
made use of opening clauses, which concerned working time 
issues (between 70 and 80%) and wage issues (between 24 
and 38%).7
Another «exit option» from collective agreement and com-
pany-level bargaining is the use of subcontractors and atypical 
contracts. Subcontractors are often poorly organized and not 
covered by collective agreements, and their use for logistics, 
catering, maintenance and even for production modules has 
been found common in the manufacturing sector (Doellgast 
and Greer 2007; Helfen 2011). Also agency workers, who are 
generally not covered by sectoral agreements (at least not at 
the beginning of their employment), have been increasingly 
employed in the manufacturing sector (Benassi and Dorigatti 
2014). The IAB data collected by Baccaro and Benassi (2014) 
show that in 1996 45% of companies in core manufacturing 
sectors employed, on average, 2% of their workforce on agency 
contracts. Before the crisis in 2008 over 90% of the companies 
employed agency workers, which constituted on average 8% of 
the company workforce. Mini-jobs have also been constantly 
increasing in the German labor market since beginning 2000s 
and are particularly common in the service sector where 5.77 
Million mini-jobbers are employed  –  compared to 1 Million 
in manufacturing (Weinkopf 2011).
These changes in the arena of industrial relations and of 
the labor market have contributed to increasing inequality in 
Germany. Indeed, according to the OECD report on income 
inequality published in 2008, Germany is the country where 
inequality and poverty have been growing faster within the 
OECD since 2000 (OECD 2008). The tables below report 
some data regarding these trends, showing that Germany has 
progressively got closer to inequality levels typical of liberal 
market economies such as the United Kingdom. Figure 8 
shows the development from the 1990 to 2010 of the P50/
7 Data from the IAB establishment panel. 
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P10 ratio, which is the ratio of median income to the upper 
bound value of the first decile of the income distribution. 
The difference between Germany and the UK is clearly vis-
ible in 1990 but it decreases until the ratios reach the same 
level in 2009. The Gini coefficient (calculated before taxes 
and transfers) presents a similar trend in Germany, growing 
from 0.43 in 1990 to 0.51 in 2011 (OECD 2014). Together 
with growing inequality, the relative poverty rate in Germany, 
measured through the rate of population below the poverty 
line (50% of median income), has been progressively increas-
ing between 1990 and 2009 (with a slight drop in 2010-2011), 
while it has been declining in the UK since the end of the 
nineties (see Figure 9).
To summarize, the redistributive mechanisms which charac-
terized the German model have been negatively affected by 
the liberalization of industrial relations. Sectoral bargaining 
institutions have become less encompassing, and low bargain-
ing coverage and the opening clauses impair inter-sectoral 
(and intra-sectoral) redistribution. Furthermore, works councils 
have found it increasingly difficult to enforce collective agree-
ments because of the diffusion of opening clauses and of the 
increase of agency work and subcontractors. These trends are 
visible even in core manufacturing sectors, showing that the 
2011
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Fig. 8.  P50/P10 Disposable income decile ratio (1990-2010) Source: OECD Database 
on Income Distribution and Poverty.
Source: OECD Database on Income Distribution and Poverty. Yearly data not 
always available for both countries.
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liberalization of industrial relations has reached the core of 
the German political economy.
Overall, the facts and figures presented in this section seem 
to corroborate the argument that the erosion of the social forces 
and institutions (primarily trade unions and sectoral collective 
bargaining) which once stimulated the demand side of the 
economy by transferring productivity increases into domestic 
consumption has contributed to weakening the wage-led engine 
and to moving the Germany economy towards an exclusively 
export-led model. The increasing reliance on exports, in turn, 
has put further pressure on industrial relations actors and 
institutions by making considerations of external competitive-
ness and cost containment a matter of national interest for 
the country as a whole.
4. concluding remarks
In this paper we have argued that the German political 
economy is undergoing a fundamental transformation from wage-
led to profit-led, and specifically: export-led. In an export-led 
economy policies that compress the wage share have beneficial 
consequences for economic growth because the stimulation of 
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Fig. 9. Poverty rate after taxes and transfers, poverty line 50% (1990-2010).
Source: OECD Database on Income Distribution and Poverty. Yearly data not 
always available for both countries.
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exports prevails over the repression of consumption and domestic 
demand, while the opposite happens in a wage-led economy.
We have also argued that the weakening of industrial relations 
institutions has played a key role in this transformation and 
there is a relationship of coevolution between macroeconomic 
developments and industrial relations institutions. The liberal 
transformation of industrial relations has facilitated the pursuit 
of an economic strategy based on external competitiveness and 
cost-cutting while the decline of household consumption has 
contributed to lock-in the export-led model. The new German 
model of industrial relations is very different from the one of 
the golden age: real wages are increasingly decoupled from 
productivity increases in all sectors, especially in the service 
periphery but recently also in the manufacturing core, and 
with a coverage rate of less than 25% of establishments in 
manufacturing, collective employment relations seem to have 
become more the exception than the rule in Germany.
These developments have allowed the German economy to 
rekindle its process of economic growth in the last few years 
after a prolonged period of stagnation but at the prize of a 
serious deterioration in distributive outcomes and social cohe-
sion. Poverty and low-end inequality have risen to levels once 
unheard of for a supposedly coordinated market economy. We 
would argue that the process of export-led growth is not on 
solid ground, as it depends on demand being thriving elsewhere. 
In 2012 37% of German exports were purchased by Eurozone 
countries, which were by far the largest destination market. As 
these and other countries are now in recession as a result of 
multi-year austerity, the German economy is negatively affected 
as well. Far from being a model for other countries, the Ger-
man economic strategy is viable only if it remains an exception 
and other countries do not follow suit example. As Bhaduri 
and Marglin reminded us (1990, p. 388), a strategy of export-
led growth becomes a logical impossibility (and contributes to 
global stagnation) if all countries pursue it simultaneously.
Interesting analytical perspectives open up for comparative 
political economy (CPE) by entering into a dialog with het-
erodox macroeconomics. The main theoretical frameworks of 
CPE have been elaborated in the 1980s, an era of crisis 
for Keynesian macroeconomics and policy-making. Similar to 
mainstream NAIRU macroeconomics, these frameworks focus 
on the supply-side characteristics of an economy  –  general vs. 
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industry-specific skills, production regimes, incremental vs. radical 
innovation, etc.  –  and generally ignore macroeconomic factors.
This paper has shown that bringing in shifts in demand 
regimes and trends in the functional income distribution be-
tween labor and capital contributes to explaining important 
political economic developments such as the trajectory of the 
German industrial relations system. To be sure, the distinction 
between wage-led and profit-led is too coarse to do justice to 
cross-country variation among advanced countries. Nonetheless, 
relative to the available theoretical frameworks in CPEs, a hy-
brid theoretical approach that integrates themes from heterodox 
macroeconomics with the traditional CPE analysis of actors 
and institutions has the distinct advantage of providing clear 
analytic tools to link international and domestic factors. The 
parameters determining whether an economy is wage-led or 
profit-led change with the degree of openness of an economy. 
Globalization makes it more difficult to sustain a wage-led 
regime because it renders investments more sensitive to move-
ments in international rates of return on capital and exports 
more important for total aggregate demand and possibly more 
sensitive to price differences. With such a hybrid framework 
it becomes easier to explain not just how and why advanced 
countries are different from one another  –  something CPE 
has traditionally excelled in  –  but also why they are, despite 
all differences, moving in the same direction.
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Softening industrial relations institutions, hardening growth model: The transforma-
tion of the German political economy
Summary: In contrast with recent literature which sees the German model as 
either a fundamentally resilient model of coordinated capitalism, or as undergoing 
liberalization only in the peripheral service sectors but not in the core manufactur-
ing ones, in this paper we make two arguments. First, we argue that a fundamental 
change is taking place in the German growth model, which is drifting away from 
the typical wage-led growth pattern of other large Eurozone economies and moving 
towards exclusively export-led growth. Second, we document a liberalizing trend in 
German industrial relations institutions in both the manufacturing sectors and in 
the service sectors, and argue that it stands in a relationship of coevolution with 
the growth model shift: the liberal erosion of industrial relations institutions has 
facilitated the pursuit of an economic strategy based on external competitiveness 
and cost-cutting, while the decline of household consumption as a driver of growth 
has contributed to lock-in the export-led model and to generate further pressure for 
industrial relations liberalization.
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